Ukrainian Case to Ukrainian Cause by Riabchuk, Mykola
UKRAINIAN CASE TO UKRAINIAN CAUSE
Mykola Ryabchuk
Catherine Wanner, Burden of Dreams. History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine.
The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998. xxvii pp. + 255 pp.
J
ust a few years of Ukrainian independence have 
prompted in the West more books and articles on 
the country than in all the preceding decades of 
Ukrainian (non)existence. Like many newcomers to the 
subject, Catherine Wanner arrived at Ukrainian topics 
from her rather substantial Russian studies—an 
ambivalent background for all who approach an 
(ex)colonial periphery from an (ex)metropolitan center. 
One can speculate whether or not another approach is 
possible and preferable, but the pitfalls of 
Russocentrism are obvious when trying to explore 
Ukraine from the historically biased and often largely 
distorted Russia-based perspective.
In most cases, Wanner avoids the temptation to 
follow the easy road of prevailing Russophile 
stereotypes and anti-Ukrainian biases. This is not an 
easy task, and sometimes she makes dubious 
references. With no additional explanations for such 
complicated, controversial and extremely sensitive 
matters, she would have us take for granted the 
"Ukrainian nationalist collaboration with the Nazis," as 
masterminded by Stepan Bandera (p. 130); a "military 
alliance with Nazi Germany," forged by the 
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (p. 163); 
oversimplistically defines OUN as "an armed force that 
originally collaborated with the Nazis during World 
War II" (p. 223); unjustifiably labels Kyiv Mohyla 
Academy as "highly nationalistic" (p. 110); discovers 
a "hypernationalist" private school in Lviv (p. 115); 
and uncritically states that "Petliura is also associated 
with the vicious pogroms committed by the UNR 
troops" (p. 223).
Occasionally she makes unsubstantiated statements 
about Ukrainian culture and media, apparently 
purchased at secondhand Russian colonial stores: 
"With little cultural capital at their disposal, political 
and cultural leaders [of Ukraine] turned to history" (p.
75); "Fewer and fewer Russian newspapers, magazines, 
books, and television programs are making their way 
into Ukraine, exacerbating an already sizeable 
information vacuum" (p. 196). Some harmless but 
noticeable factual mistakes that should have been 
avoided in such a scrupulous and otherwise well- 
elaborated study might also distress some pedantic 
readers (e.g., Volodymyr Ivasiuk, the composer, died in 
Lviv, not Chernivtsi, as the author claims; Vitaly 
Korotych, the journalist, hails from Kyiv and not 
Kharkiv; Volodymyr Vynnychenko, a writer, was not 
a historian; the huge Lenin monument in Kyiv was 
erected in 1977 and not 1946, etc.).
As a cultural anthropologist, Wanner carried out 
extensive anthropological field research in Ukraine in 
1990-96, which included both courageous trips 
throughout the country and interviews with various 
people on different occasions. Her book, as a result, 
contains exciting pieces of “creative reporting” 
supplemented, however, with perceptive academic 
analyses of numerous primary and secondary sources. 
In her introduction to Burden of Dreams, Wanner 
defines her work as a "multi-sided ethnography of 
processes, specifically the processes and dynamics 
involved in converting a nationalist ideology into an 
institutionalized national culture and a meaningful 
national identity in the aftermath of the socialist 
experiment [...]. As such, this ethnography becomes an 
anthropological study of the state, of how the state, 
through a negotiated settlement among competing 
interests and visions, attempts to establish the 
categories, periods, and events that give meaning to 
individual and collective experience, and of how such 
attempts by the state are challenged and even overruled 
by individuals through everyday practices" (p. xvii).
The book consists of two unequal parts, divided 
into three and four chapters respectively, the first,
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smaller portion of her book, entitled "The Legacy of 
Soviet Culture," provides an excellent account of "how 
a sense of nationality was constituted by the Soviet 
system" and how various loyalties and allegiances were 
incorporated into a larger, supranational Soviet identity 
(chapter 1, "Nationality in Soviet and Post-Soviet 
Ukraine" ); how a secessionist project succeeded in 
heavily Russified Ukraine and the role of historical 
revisionism in generating support for this cause 
(chapter 2, "The Rise of Nationalist Opposition"); and 
finally, how "Soviet-era patterns of discourse and 
practices [...] remain salient and give life to the values 
and practices embodied in Soviet culture even though 
the Soviet Union has collapsed" (chapter 3, "On Being 
Soviet").
The second part of the book, entitled "Sites of 
Nationalizing," deals extensively with the "sites at 
which national culture is articulated, contested, 
negotiated, and perhaps, institutionalized" (p. xix). 
Subsequently, in four chapters, four such sites are 
examined (namely, schools, festivals, the state 
calendar, and urban space) which "serve as arenas 
where a post-Soviet national culture can be articulated 
and, of course, contested as part of an overall project to 
fortify or challenge the new state” (p. 75). Such a 
choice is well justified by the critical importance of 
these sites in state efforts to "convert the meaning of 
historical events into personal events and turn a 
national identity into a personal identity" (p. 206). 
Naturally, there are other sites of equal or even greater 
importance that could and probably should be 
explored—the national media, for example, or sporting 
events (in September 1998, over 90% of the 
respondents to a poll in the Crimea supported the 
Ukrainian soccer team in her victorious match against 
the Russians). Nonetheless, the general paradigm for 
the research has been firmly established, and the results 
seem to be very plausible.
The major assumption of Wanner's research is that 
any state has a vested interest in nationalizing 
processes, because "their success or failure directly 
affect perceptions of state legitimacy" (xvii). And for 
Ukraine, a "new state steeped in economic crisis 
legitimating itself against a culturally oppressive 
multinational empire [...], the institutionalization of a 
national culture is a project of paramount importance" 
(p. xxi). Yet, Wanner argues, "the legacy of 
statelessness, combined with the mosaic of influences 
it produced and comparatively close cultural and 
geographical proximity to Russia, makes the process of
articulating a national culture and a sense of national 
identity to reflect new political realities [in Ukraine] 
particularly complex" (p. xviii).
In the author's view, there are two major obstacles 
to nationalizing efforts in Ukraine: first, the 11 million 
members of the Russian minority, more than 20% of 
the Ukrainian population; and second, the largely 
Russified Ukrainian majority (at least one-third of 
ethnic Ukrainians are apparently Russophone). 
Therefore, Wanner claims, any attempt to nationalize 
"the people of Ukraine" (narod Ukrainy) into the 
"Ukrainian people" (ukrains'kyj narod) triggers not 
only interethnic tensions but also intraethnic discord: 
the Russified Ukrainians have little, if any, wish to be 
renationalized. They feel they were rather freely 
assimilated into Russian culture than brutally 
victimized by Russian and Soviet cultural policies (p. 
xix).
The author seems to be of two minds—caught 
between the nationalistic depiction of the "historic 
relationship between Ukrainians and the Russian and 
Soviet states in terms of cultural subjugation, economic 
exploitation, forced assimilation, and genocide"; and 
the "creolic" concept of peaceful and voluntary 
assimilation into the dominant culture through 
"intermarriage, mobility, and the media" (p. xix). The 
numerous facts and historical references in the book 
confirm the former, nationalistic view, but the latter 
creolic view remains unquestioned and unexplained.
Occasionally Wanner comes very close to the 
problem, but never close enough to reveal it. For 
example, at many points she writes about "confusion 
and apathy toward national re-identification in post- 
Soviet Ukraine" (p. 50), and about "cultural and 
historic amnesia collectively experienced by 
Ukrainians" (p. 123); she quotes common people who 
claim that "earlier [in the USSR] we never had any 
problems with nationalities" (p. 69) and that their 
nationality had "no meaning" for them and never did 
(p. 15). She also describes the "process of stripping 
down the individuality and dignity of every citizen to 
create homo sovieticus" and "peeling back the histories 
and cultures of many nationalities in the Soviet Union 
to create the Soviet people" (p. 49).
This "stripping" and "peeling" was not merely 
metaphorical. Powerful propaganda was effectively 
supplemented with secret police terror, concentration 
camps, and mass killings. Referring to the manmade 
famine of 1932-33, which resulted in the deaths by 
starvation of at least 5 million Ukrainians, Catherine
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Wanner states that "for a peasant-based people, this 
meant that the nation and its 'soul' had been destroyed" 
(p. 43). Wanner, however, does not take the next step 
to draw a proper conclusion from all these general 
observations, namely, Ukrainians, in general, were not 
just "freely" assimilated into the "mainstream" culture, 
but rather, were brutally dispossessed from their 
linguistic and cultural identity. Therefore, in actuality, 
the Ukrainian people had been "raped" throughout the 
centuries in a most violent and humiliating way. Now, 
the rape victims typically defend their traumatized 
consciousness, widely exposing their "cultural 
amnesia," their "confusion and apathy," and claiming 
that they had not been "raped" but, rather, got married 
quite voluntarily.
Actually, they avoid any talk on the topic as 
potentially dangerous and, again, traumatizing. Wanner 
has perfectly captured this phenomenon: "We don't 
care what a person's nationality is," says one of her 
interviewees. "The whole idea is strange to us" (p. 19). 
The explanation she offers is good but hardly 
sufficient: "Many people feel Soviet out of recognition 
of having collectively endured the ill-fated Bolshevik 
experiment. Soviet culture was, of course, supported 
by an entire ideological system, a way of life perceived 
as unique, and the institution of citizenship... The 
enduring practices created by the Soviet system [...] 
sustain the social relations they spawned and influence 
the pace and nature of social change in post-Soviet 
society" (p. 50).
One must realize that no "ideological system" per 
se, no "way of life," no "institution of citizenship" 
could ever create such a dreadful phenomenon as the 
Soviet identity—not without total and permanent 
coercion. Soviet identity was not just a social 
experiment, but was also a genetic one that 
lobotomized the weak and obedient species, while 
euthanizing the strong and resistant breeds. The people 
who therefore claim to "never [have] had any problems 
with nationalities" (p. 69) or that their own nationality 
had "no meaning" for them (p. 15) are only speaking a 
half-truth. They are probably right when they say that 
they themselves have no problem with 
nationalities—after all, they had chosen (or inherited) 
the right nationality, language, and identity—the Soviet 
identity. But ask a Ukrainian about their fellow citizens 
who do grapple with their own national identities, and 
they will certainly say that these people are 
"nationalists"—people who care about their 
nationalities, and who fully deserved the treatment they
received under Soviet rule. The message is clear: we 
don't care what a person's nationality is—as long as it 
is Soviet (or Russian), like ours; nationality has no 
meaning for us—as long it is truly meaningless under 
the Soviet/Russian superidentity. On one hand, this 
makes a good excuse for the "raped" to accept violence 
as progressive development; on the other hand, it is an 
equally good excuse for the "rapists" to persecute 
"nationalists" who devote too much thought to their 
non-Soviet nationalities, their "virgin" non-Russian 
cultures, and their languages.
Catherine Wanner is essentially aware of the 
ambiguity of Soviet "internationalism" and "anti-
nationalism" as peculiar forms of Russian nationalistic 
ideology. "Even though the Soviet Union was never 
organized as a Russian state per se," she notes, 
"Russians were the dominant nationality. They 
controlled the key Party and state positions in the 
government. Russian was the lingua franca of the state, 
the media, education, and printing, and this created 
formidable pressure to assimilate to the Russian 
language" (p. 13).
Wanner is also aware of how the term "bourgeois 
nationalism" was misused by the Soviets, who applied 
it in the witch hunt against all who resisted the 
“progressive” pace of Sovietization/Russification. 
"This was particularly so in Ukraine," Dr. Wanner 
writes, "where various decrees celebrated 
'internationalist' values as the police apparatus rooted 
out 'bourgeois nationalism' and 'hostile foreign 
influences', Soviet labels for national and religious 
sentiments and activities" (p. 24). And since "Ukrainian 
nationalism was" not just an ideological label, but a 
criminal accusation, it was effectively used to eliminate 
any "nationalistic" sentiment or attachment, and to 
discredit nearly all Ukrainian leaders and activists 
throughout history.
Yet this ideological brainwashing would never 
have resulted in such a profound Sovietization of 
Ukrainian society were it not for the purges, terroristic 
witch-hunts and other genocidal forms of Soviet 
"psychotherapy." The Ukrainian (and Belorussian and 
even, to some extent, the Russian) case is clear when 
compared with those of the Baltics, Poles, or the 
western Ukrainians who had not been exposed as long 
or hard to the Soviet and Russian imperial 
"engineering" system. "The ability to externalize 
socialism and to conceive of Soviet rule as a foreign 
imposition is a critical culture difference between the 
western provinces and other regions of Ukraine,"
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Wanner writes (p. 122). In eastern Ukraine, we might 
continue, since the “Sovietism” had been internalized, 
peculiar psychological ties between the victims and the 
victimizes emerged—a kind of conspiracy or, more 
accurately, pervasive solidarity between the "raped" 
and the "rapists" which to this day stands as a major 
obstacle to further de-Sovietization and 
“Ukrainization.”
Perhaps the notion of the deep psychological 
trauma experienced by Ukrainians could have given the 
author a better key to understanding the problems she 
vigorously discusses in her well-documented book. At 
one point she insightfully writes: "The pervasiveness 
and persistence of a Russian-based Sovietized culture 
impinges upon a redesign of Ukrainian society by 
hampering reform in numerous ways..." A little effort 
is needed to interpret the “persistence” through the 
“pervasiveness.” The author, however, largely seems to 
ignore the anthropological methodology elaborated by 
contemporary post-colonial studies (no classic book of 
the sort is actually referred to in the bibliography, nor 
is the term "colonial" listed in the index, despite the 
fact that it is employed in the text at least twelve times). 
This makes the author's approach rather positivistic: the 
Sovietization/Russification of Ukraine is treated as an 
essentially social and cultural phenomenon—a sort of 
"inertia," inherited, socially constructed, and imposed 
on the society's way of life, thought, and behavior. 
Implicitly this suggests that, in the newly independent 
Ukraine, these old patterns could be gradually replaced 
with new ones, and this is what "Ukrainization/ de- 
Sovietization" could mean. But these changes are not 
progressing well, if progressing at all, to the growing 
irritation of Ukrainian patriots and Western observers.
The Ukrainian state, of course, cannot forge and 
impose a new identity with the same means used by 
the Soviet state. The new Ukraine seems to rely first 
and foremost on the "natural" development of 
democracy, where the return to the norm is the ultimate 
goal. Yet the notion of the "norm" in a heavily 
Sovietized country is largely distorted and mystified; 
there is no public consensus on things "normal," nor a 
dialogue between the adherents of opposing views on 
"normality." In reality, Ukraine still lives today in a 
"cold civil war"—cold only because the Ukrainian 
people are too tired, indifferent, and alienated. They 
still live in mythical worlds of "cultural and historic 
amnesia," as Wanner has aptly noted; they seldom 
respond to intrusion from the outer world with 
militancy, but rather with "confusion and apathy."
To understand this phenomenon, the psychological 
consequences of historical victimization should be 
considered, and some methods from psychoanalysis 
could be applied to deconstruct both the consciousness 
and subconsciousness of Sovietized Ukrainians. 
Wanner comes close to the problem when writing about 
the "harrowing and haunting images of the past," and 
about the "erased or significantly altered" memories (p. 
45), but again, she does not attempt to answer why 
Ukraine has no "independent social criteria for 
evaluating and eventually accepting or rejecting rival 
interpretations of the past." Or, in other words, why 
Ukrainians are not listening to each other, to scholars, 
to politicians, or to anyone who could destroy their 
psychologically settled "ignorance" and rekindle the 
traumatizing feeling of being "raped"—or, equally 
uncomfortably, of being a "rapist."
This may well explain why "Chernobyl symbolized 
the exploitative nature of the system and the 
victimization of Ukraine under Soviet rule" (p. 32) 
much more persuasively than the Great Famine or any 
other historical event for Ukrainian national leaders, 
who used it to mobilize people toward independence. 
The Chernobyl atomic disaster was made by "them" 
(Moscow) to "us" (all the inhabitants of Ukraine). The 
Famine was less clear: it affected only some of "us" 
(rural Ukrainians), while others (urban Ukrainians and 
Russians) enjoyed relative comfort and prosperity, 
largely because of the enslavement and cruel 
exploitation of the Ukrainophone kolkhoz serfs. The 
question of active and, especially, passive collaboration 
of many (if not the majority) of "us" with "them" makes 
modem Ukrainian history more divisive than unifying. 
Therefore, modern Ukrainian history played a minor 
role in public mobilization for the secessionist cause 
(except for Western Ukraine). Ancient history proved 
to be much more appealing: Kyivan Rus', considered a 
common history for both Ukrainians and Russians, and 
the Cossacks, whose conflicts with Russians were 
ignored while their fights against Poles and Tatars were 
overemphasized. Yet, of paramount appeal was the 
vision of the economic prosperity of an independent 
Ukraine—a vision that looked forward rather than to 
the past.
As soon as this vision faded, and the new social 
order proved to be, in many aspects, "far crueler and 
more unpredictable than the old" (p. 202), the 
Ukrainian state faced a "burden of dreams" which 
might well become unbearable. Despite some 
achievements and positive changes, carefully noted by
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Wanner in the examined realms, a "fragile [Ukrainian] 
state mired in economic chaos [...] with russification, 
sovietization, and sharp regionalization as legacies to 
overcome and little in the way of broad cultural 
unifiers, such as a common language or religion," 
seems to be rather unsuccessful, so far, in forging a 
"collective identity to unify [its] highly indifferent, 
diverse, and disenfranchised population" (p. 75).
What surfaces instead, is the profound eclecticism 
of Ukrainian life and an essential ambivalence of 
people's views and behaviors. Wanner discovers these 
symptoms at every site she considers. For example, "In 
1992 [in order to de-Sovietize schools] a government 
decree was issued, stating that each school had to 
remove all Soviet propaganda, portraits of Lenin, 
slogans, etc." Yet, Wanner reports, "the enforcement of 
such decrees has become random and ineffective" (p. 
218). And the situation at the universities is no better: 
"Departments of atheism became departments of 
religion; departments of political economy transformed 
themselves into departments of management and 
marketing; departments of the history of the USSR now 
focus on the history of Ukraine; former departments of 
philosophy now call themselves departments of 
culturology; and so on. Needless to say, few professors 
and administrators, nearly all of whom have retained 
their jobs, are able to 'restructure' themselves, their 
disciplines, their courses, and their work routines from 
one year to the next" (p. 87).
The same ambiguity is also discovered in the 
analysis of the official Ukrainian calendar, where new 
national and reestablished religious holidays mix 
grotesquely with the old Soviet ones. And the urban 
symbolic landscape—monuments and street 
signs—considered in the last chapter provides the 
scholar with further arguments to conclude that a 
"newly institutionalized Ukrainocentric perspective on 
historical interpretation of the Soviet period must 
engage the representations of official Soviet narrative 
[...]. The signs emerging from this encounter [are] read 
alongside the old signs of Soviet ideology, new signs of 
capitalist consumerism, and above all, signs of 
confusion" (pp. 198-99).
The confusing, eclectic nature of Ukrainian life, 
Wanner convincingly argues, results from the 
ambivalent nature of Ukrainian society, which is deeply 
divided along regional, cultural, ethnic, linguistic, 
religious, generational, and many other lines. From the 
very beginning of her book, Wanner refuses to 
conceptualize nationalism in Ukraine "in overly stark
terms, such as 'diaspora Russians in the east versus 
nationalistic Ukrainians in the west' with language as 
the sole criterion delineating group membership." 
Instead, she argues that "the fracturing of Ukraine goes 
beyond an east-west dichotomy and creates national 
and linguistic divides that are far more blurred than the 
national allegiances that are assumed to follow 
linguistic lines" (p. xxvi). There are many concrete 
examples in her book which confirm such a 
multidimensional fracturing of Ukrainian society; 
however, some conceptual generalization cannot be 
avoided.
It is clear that there is a large group of "committed" 
Ukrainians, primarily located in the west, whose ethnic 
identity coincides with their cultural and linguistic 
identity, as well as with their political loyalty to an 
independent Ukraine. There is also a large group of 
"committed" Soviets, for the most part located in the 
southeast, whose ethnic identity is irrelevant ("has no 
meaning," as one sincerely said), but whose cultural 
and linguistic identity is predominantly Russian-Soviet, 
and whose political loyalty largely rests with some sort 
of old-new Empire. For better or worse, each group still 
remains a minority in Ukraine, while the (relative) 
majority consists of russified Ukrainians whose 
loyalties and identities are, in truth, blurred. The 
tendency of their social behavior is much clearer: 
politically, they tend to be Ukrainian, while culturally 
they are Russian, or rather, Soviet.
In December 1991 these Russified Ukrainians 
supported the committed Ukrainians in their struggle 
for political independence, but at the same time they 
supported the Soviet presidential candidate as a 
guarantee that relatively minimal cultural changes 
would occur, and that the Soviet way of life would 
largely be preserved. This paradox does not go 
unnoticed in Catherine Wanner's book: "Political 
borders,” she writes, “were quickly redrawn following 
the failed coup, but cultural barriers are not so easily 
dislodged. In spite of widespread support for an 
independent Ukrainian state, many living in Ukraine 
are less supportive of the cultural changes that have 
followed new state formation" (pp. 46-48).
Of course, this ethno-linguistic group is far from 
being monolithic and uniform in its cultural and 
political orientations. One cannot deny, however, that 
this group is a major source of ambivalence in 
Ukrainian society, as well as the ambiguity of its 
political, economic and cultural (under)development. 
On one hand, they seem to play a positive role by
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preventing the committed Ukrainians and the 
committed Soviets from direct clashes, thereby granting 
Ukraine some sort of stability. On the other hand, this 
ambivalent and largely disoriented ("confused" is 
Wanner's term) majority serves as a powerful social 
base for the ruling post-communist nomenklatura 
which effectively hinders any radical changes and 
keeps the country deeply stagnated.
Regrettably, Catherine Wanner does not sufficiently 
explain the essence of the ruling regime, whose very 
political existence is largely determined by the 
ambivalent character of Ukrainian society. In 
particular, it is determined by the confused, partly 
Russian and partly Ukrainian, identity of the majority 
of the people. From some of Wanner's remarks, 
however, one could conclude that "nationalist leaders" 
(p. 48) came to power in 1991, that the nationalist 
ideology elaborated by Rukh ("the umbrella opposition 
movement advocating a nationalist platform" [p. 22]) 
became a quasi-official ideology in the newly 
independent Ukraine, and that since that time Ukrainian 
elites have done their best "to promote a national 
culture based on an alternative [nationalistic] historical 
interpretation that repositions the historic relationship 
with Russia and sets the parameters of a new 
independent, European-oriented, Ukrainian nation-
state" (p. 171). The most overt expression of this view 
is offered in the author's statement that "even Leonid 
Makarovych Kravchuk, a former leading anti-
nationalist, head of ideology, and chairman of the 
Supreme Soviet in Ukraine, began to swiftly 
'restructure' himself into a proponent of nationalism in 
1990 in time to campaign to be the first president of 
independent Ukraine by adopting 90 percent of the 
Rukh program" (p. 46).
This position, however, leaves room to explain why 
the state has failed actually to achieve any of its 
presumably "nationalizing" goals. The author seems 
simply to believe that a "nationalistic" Ukrainian 
leadership sincerely seeks to "Ukrainize" the country, 
but wavers "for fear of alienating the large Russified 
constituencies" (p. 120). Again, Catherine Wanner 
seems to yield to a positivistic view of the 
"nationalizing" state versus the resistant, heavily 
sovietized/russified population. Such a view is certainly 
better than the folk-tale notion of a "good" Ukrainian 
pro-reform tsar at the top and "bad" anti-Ukrainian, 
anti-reform servants below—the notion promoted by 
some pro-government advocates. However, the view 
largely ignores the ambivalent (again, "wavering")
character of the ruling elites who themselves are a part 
of the Sovietized/Russified population, perhaps even 
more Russified than on average due to career 
requirements. In any case, these elites are far from 
committed to any ideology except that of their own 
personal enrichment. They would never pursue any 
ideologically determined, reformist policy (including 
"Ukrainization") that would threaten their non- 
ideological, overriding interests in power and property.
Thus, these elites not only reflect the ambivalent 
feelings and attitudes of the majority of the people, but 
also do their best to preserve this ambivalence as a 
source of their societal dominance. As a result, Ukraine 
seems to have no coherent and comprehensive 
policy—be it in culture, in the economy, in state-
building, in international relations, or in anything else. 
The ruling elites pursue no set strategy but the strategic 
goal of day-to-day survival in order to grab the 
maximum benefit from "privatized" power and state 
property. Such a policy lacks any articulated principles 
and transparent decisions, since it is largely based on 
"under the table" arrangements and "share-holding" 
concessions to different regions, clans, or political 
groups (including, on occasion, Ukrainian nationalists 
as well as "Soviets"). Of course, any nation-state by 
definition "nationalizes," regardless of which foreign 
or native "dynasty" rules it—and Ukraine is no 
exception. "Nationalizing," however, does not 
necessarily mean "nativizing"; in neighboring Belarus, 
for example, "nationalizing" means further 
Russification and sovietization, accompanied with the 
inevitable repression of the Belorussian language and 
culture. In Ukraine, the situation is more complicated; 
neither Russification-Sovietization tendencies have 
thus far succeeded, as they have in Belarus, nor have 
Ukrainianization-Westemization tendencies gained the 
upper hand, as they have in the Baltics.
Such widespread ambiguity in the Ukrainian state, 
neither communist nor capitalist, neither pro-western 
nor pro-Russian, neither quite Soviet nor quite 
Ukrainian, is occasionally perceived as a kind of 
postmodern and/or post-colonial pluralism, which in an 
inclusive way integrates exclusive historical and 
cultural narratives and promotes a much-needed 
reconciliation within the society. Unfortunately, 
however, it is eclecticism rather than pluralism which 
reigns supreme over Ukraine. It results from the fact 
that no rival force, so far, has proved to be strong 
enough to overcome its worst enemy and to push the 
country, like the Baltics, forward or, like Belarus, back.
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Since both the committed Ukrainians and the 
committed Soviets are only a minority, they are easily 
manipulated by the ruling non-ideological 
nomenklatura that still controls the majority of 
"confused" Ukrainian Russophones. The latter group, 
however, due to its unstable and ambiguously 
ambivalent identity, is often a major target of both 
committed Ukrainians and committed Soviets, who lay 
equal claim to the group as their own.
Apparently the "cold civil war" cannot persist 
forever. Ukrainian "Soviets" can no longer withstand 
a shock without a therapy, an existence without any 
economic rewards from the independent state. And 
committed Ukrainians can no longer be satisfied with 
their marginal role in a would-be Ukrainian state. 
Catherine Wanner proves to be quite aware of this 
contradiction: "For a population that has been russified 
and sovietized, the prospects of now being ukrainized 
can seem daunting. For those who have long awaited 
the institutionalization of a Ukrainian national culture 
under its own state, the feelings are one of elation, 
relief, and disappointment" (p. 198). Hence, the "hybrid 
forms of economic, political, social, and cultural life" 
she foresees emerging from Ukraine are far from being 
the worst outcome of the current situation. Yet the 
author's suggestion to "be prepared to witness and 
analyze the unexpected" (p. 207) should encourage us 
instead to better analyze what we witness, and to fnake 
the unexpected rather expectable.
In this light, Catherine Wanner's book, despite some 
analytical shortcomings and minor errors, gives an 
insightful view of contemporary Ukraine, and 
contributes significantly to further studies of a peculiar 
yet very important region.
Mykola Ryabchuk is Deputy Editor ofKrytyka Monthly 
(Kyiv).
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